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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the fact that almost all of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa introduced multiparty elec-
tions during the 1990’s and that the region has seen democratic progress over the years, only nine 
out of the regions forty-nine states were considered by Freedom House in 2011 to be free and 
democratic. 
 
Using a multivariate logistic regression this paper adopts the preconditionist view of democratiza-
tion theory and attempts to test and develop the argument that the variation in democratic consoli-
dation in Sub-Saharan African countries can be attributed to levels of corruption at early stages of 
democratization. 
 
The covariation between degrees of corruption and democratic consolidation is strong. Moreover, 
both the bivariate and the multivariate logistic regression conducted in the analysis, and other visu-
alizations of the two models, gives us further reason to believe that the degrees of corruption at a 
certain time serve as an important precondition. There are, however, reasons to interpret the data 
with care due to lack of observations and significant relationships. 
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Introduction 
In an article in The Economist late March 20121, the author asks the question of which way African 
politics will go. Will it pursue the path of Senegal where the incumbent president in the latest elec-
tion respected his country’s democratic traditions and conceded electoral defeat to a younger rival, 
or will it go in the path of nearby Mali where the 2012 coup d’état abruptly ended a twenty-year 
long history of democracy?  
The question is undeniably interesting because whilst there is only one African state today that does 
not hold general elections, Eritrea, only nine out of the regions forty-nine states are considered by 
Freedom House to be free and democratic. This is the case despite the fact that almost all of them 
introduced multiparty elections for the first time during the 1990’s, that Sub-Saharan Africa has 
seen real democratic progress over the years and that today democracy is no longer only seen as an 
ideal but an achievable end goal. Yet, gradual erosion in the regions democratic standards has been 
observed by numerous sources. Using the articles examples, Freedom House reported a decrease in 
electoral democracies from 24 in 2005 to 19 in 2012 and the Mo Ibrahim index, an indicator 
quantatively measuring good governance, revealed a five percent decline in electoral participation 
between 2007 and today. As such, democracies do not always survive. What can the variation in 
consolidation success be attributed to? Why is it that some countries have become democratically 
consolidated while some have not? 
This paper presents two separate schools of democratization theorists, the “preconditionists” and 
the “universalists”, and attempts to theoretically and empirically contribute to the preconditionist 
school of democratization theory by addressing the variation in democratic consolidation in Sub-
Saharan African and attempts to develop and test the argument that the variation can be attributed 
to levels of corruption in early stages of democratization. 
 
Addressing the discourse on democratization theory 
Whereas there in contemporary politics are very few that would argue against democracy as a supe-
rior form of governance, there is instead a debate on how democracies emerge and how they can 
develop and consolidate (Berman, 2007, Huntington, 1991).  
                                                     
1
 http://www.economist.com/node/21551494, accessed 7 Nov. 12 
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Giving a historical review of the history of democratization in Western Europe, Sheri Berman ar-
gues that there are two different schools of democratization theorists, the “preconditionists” and 
the “universalists”, where the former argues that there has to be a particular set of conditions and 
experiences already in place for a democracy to emerge, whilst the latter argues that a democracy 
can come about in all sorts of ways and settings (Berman, 2007:28).  
Both schools have had their periods of academic dominance. The preconditionists dominated the 
1950’s and 1960’s, stressing the importance of national preconditions – the rule of law and a well-
functioning state above all – and other already existing structural factors, such as socioeconomic 
equality and development as well as cultural traits and beliefs. Where certain arrangements of these 
preconditions existed a successful democratization process was likely, and where they were absent 
the same process would result unsuccessful (Berman, 2007).  
Scholars such as Lipset, Przeworski, and Dahl contended that nations with a relatively high socio-
economic development would be more likely to sustain democracy (Osei, 2012) and others argued 
that democracy was contingent on the existence of certain social classes (e.g. Beckman, 1989). Fur-
thermore, looking at newly elected leaders restricting rights and abusing their powers Zakaria (1997) 
alerted that rapid democratization produced “a plague of illiberal democracy” and violent conflict 
breaking out in newly democratizing regions led Mansfield and Snyder (1995) to argue that democ-
ratizing states are more prone to conflict than stable autocracies. 
As such, it was argued that policy makers needed to take this into account and rethink their ap-
proach to democracy promotion (Carothers, 2007) and perhaps also accept the fact that in most of 
the world certain preconditions did not exist, and would make democratization hard, if not impos-
sible (2007:28-29). 
The universalists, however, believe that a consolidated democracy can emerge through a diverse 
number of paths and circumstances. They believe that the idea that certain prerequisites made de-
mocratization possible should be abandoned. The democratic resurgences beginning in the 1970’s, 
often characterized as the “third wave” of democratization, led to a strong tendency in favor of the 
universalist view (see Berman, 2007, Karl, 1990).  
Scholars such as O’Donnell and Schmitter adopted this view and understands democratization as 
“a historical process with analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, stages of transition, consol-
idation, persistence, and eventual deconsolidation” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Indeed, Bratton 
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and de Walle showed that there was no correlation between economic development and democrati-
zation in Africa as both very poor and relatively wealthy countries underwent democratic change 
(Bratton & de Walle, 1997). 
The overlapping dominance of each school has also had influence on foreign policy in separate 
times. Though, as Berman (2007) argues, the universalist view dominated most of the 90’s and 
post-9/11 – believing that democracy can thrive in any place with what she calls “shock therapy” – 
the debates on the quality of democratic progress in Third World countries have further ignited the 
preconditionist view of democratization and the preconditionist view has been experiencing resur-
gence in recent years.  
More recently, Carothers has argued that levels of economic development, if sources of national 
wealth are concentrated, if political pluralism has been historically experienced, if there are identity-
based divisions and if a state is located in a nondemocratic “neighborhood” spurs democratic suc-
cess or not (Carothers, 2007:24). Furthermore, Zakaria argues that democratic experiments imple-
mented in countries with no history of political liberalism will inevitably run into problems (Zakar-
ia, 1997) and Mansfield and Snyder (2005) have warned about “the dangers that can arise when 
democratic transitions do not follow a auspicious sequence” where “strong political institutions that 
make democracy work (effective state, rule of law and organized parties … and professional news 
media” advance before the process of democratization (see also Berman, 2007:30). 
Previous literature has thus addressed numerous other preconditions for democratic consolidation. 
What about levels of corruption as a precondition? The academic field is strikingly lacking infor-
mation about the role of corruption as a precondition for democratic consolidation. Resting on the 
preconditionist assumptions above this paper will develop and test that the variation in democratic 
consolidation can be attributed to levels of corruption at early stages of democratization.  
However, before entering into a discussion about consolidation and corruption – what does a de-
mocracy need to encompass before it can be considered as consolidated? The concept of democra-
cy, whilst being an essential concept in comparative politics, is equally elusive and open for difficul-
ties in conceptualization and measurement.  
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Democracy – more than formal mechanism and institutions 
Samuel Huntington argues that contemporary definitions of democracy can be divided into three 
separate families: those based on “the sources of authority for government”, “the purposes served 
by government”, or “the procedures for constituting the government” (Huntington, 1991:6).  For 
this papers purposes, the latter is of most relevance and it defines democracy as a political system 
where its most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in 
which all the adult population are eligible to vote (Huntington, 1991:7). In this view democracy can 
be argued to be made out of two dimensions – contestation and participation (1991:7).  
Przeworski, et al., (2000) also focus on contestation as the essential feature of democracy, as did 
most of the international community including major donors and organizations during the 90’s and 
00’s (see Collier, 2009). This led to the wide spread of elections in both Africa and other regions of 
the world where the political landscape was undergoing change. As Collier correctly analyses elec-
tions was regarded not only as the most visible feature of democracy but rather its defining charac-
teristics (2009:15). 
However, this view of democracy could be regarded as a minimal form of institutional democracy 
where the free and fair electoral process defines the political system (as also argued by Huntington, 
1991). Indeed, regardless of which terminology used and how concepts are defined it is a fact that 
far from all democratizing countries become democracies, and that all democratized countries re-
main democracies. What is it that determines democratic stability and consolidation? 
 
Consolidation – an equally elusive concept with measurement problems 
Robert Dahl argued that party competition is necessary but insufficient (1971), outlining a claim 
that a proper democracy does not only need to have the mechanisms and characteristics of a demo-
cratic structure but that it must also have the rules of conduct for such a system (see also Collier, 
2009). This is similarly argued by many other scholars, most notably Linz and Stepan (1996). Ac-
cording to them a consolidated democracy needs to exhibit more substantive features than the 
formal mechanisms and institutions. They define a consolidated democracy as: 
 
“a political situation in which a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that 
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democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern the collec-
tive life … [and wherein] governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the 
territory of the state … are subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict with-
in the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the democratic process.” 
(1996:7) 
 
Linz and Stepan continue their assertion by adding the prerequisite that in order to define democ-
racy as consolidated there should also be acceptance of the functioning state by its own people 
showing that the substantive features of a democracy lie buried more deep within a society than just 
within the formal institutions (1996:7).  
The difference between democratization and a consolidated democracy can thus, as Fernandez has 
argued, be that “while the democratization process could lead to a state with a democratic system, a 
consolidated democracy encompasses the understanding of the system and the formal and informal 
acceptance of its own citizens in regard to institutional, political and societal obedience to demo-
cratic rules and practices” (Fernandez, 2006:7).  
Still, although establishing the substantive features of democracy, democratic consolidation is not 
an easy task. Diamond (1997) expresses this view quite clearly and shows that  
 
“Democracy may be the most common form of government in the world, but outside of 
the wealthy industrialized nations it tends to be shallow, illiberal, and poorly institutional-
ized. If there are no immediate threats of democratic collapse in most of those countries, 
neither are there clear signs that democracy has been consolidated and stable, truly the only 
viable political system and method for the foreseeable future. In fact, most of the 70 new 
democracies that have come into being since the start of the third wave, only a small num-
ber are generally considered to be deeply rooted and secure. The remainder appear now 
‘condemned’ to remain democratic while they muddle through as ‘unconsolidated democ-
racies’.” 
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How has previous research addressed democratic consolidation? The most widespread conceptual-
ization is that a democracy is “consolidated” when it is “likely to endure” and expected to “last well 
into the future” (Schedler, 2001, O’Donnell, 1996, Valenzuela, 1992). This “thin” conceptualiza-
tion, however, creates operationalization difficulties as it resides on expectations on the future 
(Schedler, 2001:67). There have been three different approaches to this operationalization difficulty.  
The first assumption, focusing on behavioral foundations of stability, is that it is the key political actors 
that sustain political institutions. Schedler writes that: “democracy is neither a divine gift nor a side 
effect of societal factors; it is the work of political actors” (2001:68).  This is a somewhat similar 
assessment to what Linz and Stepan (1996) advocates – that a democracy has been consolidated 
when democratic processes and institutions become “the only game in town” (1996:5), and this 
only happens when actors decide to “play the game”. The second assumption outlines an attitudinal 
foundation of democratic governance where it is argued that democracy is always under risk unless 
all major political actors develop “normative motive, strategic rationality and cognitive perceptions” 
in order to sustain a regime of liberal democracy (Schedler, 2001:85). Thirdly, others draw attention 
to the socio-economic foundation of a democratic regime. Feeling “safe” in the consolidation only 
occurs when the socio-economic environment and its institutional settings look promising for the 
continuity of democracy (2001:85). 
How are these modes of measurement ordered hierarchically looking at historical examples? 
Schedler, looking at examples from South America, argues that behavioral evidence overshadows 
both attitudinal and structural factors (2001:85). As such, whether a state becomes consolidated or 
not relies heavily on if the key political actors behave democratically or not, for instance if a key 
political figure steps down from office and if electoral results are respected.  
Indeed, the perhaps most cited indicator of measuring democratic consolidation and its extent pro-
vided is the “one-turnover test” (Schedler, 2001:73). The test contends that democratic consolida-
tion occurs when the willingness of accepting democracy comes from political actors accepting it 
not only as a way of gaining more power, but also where “parties lose elections” (see for instance 
Przeworski, et al., 1991:10). The acceptance of the test is not universal and several scholars have 
brought forth claims of its limitations and that it does not represent sufficient evidence of political 
commitment from electoral competitors. For instance, it is argued that the test misclassifies domi-
nant party systems as well as presidential systems with “limited non-reelection rules” (Gunther et al, 
1995, Huntington, 1991, Schedler, 2001). Yet, Schedler argues “the way political actors handle in-
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stances of alteration in government constitutes an excellent indicator of their democratic commit-
ment” (2001:73). 
As this paper attempts to develop and test the argument that the variation in democratic consolida-
tion can be attributed to levels of corruption at early stages of democratization, let us have a look at 
what corruption is and why it as a precondition could be detrimental to democratic consolidation. 
 
Corruption as a precondition for democratic consolidation 
This paper sets out to investigate the role played by corruption as a precondition for democratic 
consolidation. Being one of the most widely researched areas of governance, corruption was de-
fined by Van Roy already in 1970 as “the use of power for profit, preferment or prestige, for a ben-
efit of one’s self, group or class in a way that constitutes a breach of law or of standards of high 
moral conduct” (Van Roy, 1970:86). The present conventional view of corruption is the misuse of 
public power for private gain (Treisman, 2007). This is also the definition used by both the World Bank 
(1997) and UNDP (1999). 
Corruption is today a major governance issue (Szeftel, 1998) and takes place at many levels and in a 
wide range of scales. There is also a general agreement that a variation in institutional quality is 
perhaps the biggest source of cross-country differences in developmental patterns (Persson & 
Sjöstedt, 2010). Addressing such variations has become one of the lead policy issues in efforts to 
promote political reform and good governance (Szeftel, 1998). At the heart of these efforts are 
multilateral and bilateral donors attempting to reduce corruption in developing countries, with the 
focus on weak institutions that allow for illicit practices to flourish and become entrenched (John-
ston, 2000).  
A conclusion that can be drawn from the definition is that corruption involves both the abuse of 
public roles and resources allocated in the public sphere for private gains (Johnston, 2000). Howev-
er, distinctions between “the public” and “the private” can be hard to draw and although establish-
ing the occurrence of corrupt behavior very little is known about what causes corruption to be 
higher in one place than another (Treisman, 2000). Although Treisman maintains that one of the 
reasons for this is the difficulty of measuring levels of relative corruption in different countries 
(2000:400), it can also be because what can be determined as a corrupt action, whether a single act 
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or as a norm within a political system, varies between settings and analyses contingent upon the 
definition used and within the legal framework it appears (Rothstein & Teorell, 2005, Weitz, 2012).  
In an attempt to address this, Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) argue that corruption has either been 
seen as a structural problem within economics and politics or a problem of morality within cultures 
or individuals. It has come naturally for political science to focus on the institutional mechanisms 
and characteristics, the regime types and democracy in the study of corruption (Weitz, 2012:9).  
 
Democracy and corruption – and the effect on democratic consolidation 
What has previous research found in regard to the effect of corruption on democratic consolida-
tion? Democracy and corruption have long been treated as important factors in determining overall 
development. To date, the most persuasive evidence of both the harms and benefits of corruption 
are for economic development, and when studies have been made considering democracy and cor-
ruption together, corruption has nearly always been treated as the dependent variable.  
Billger and Goel, (2009) sampled 99 countries from 2001-2003 and showed that democratic institu-
tions reduce corruption; Montinola and Jackman (2002) sampled 66 countries from 1980-1983 and 
argue that democracy has to increase first, and then corruption will decrease. Additionally, Sung 
(2004) used the Corruption Perceptions Index for 103 countries from 1995-2000 and provided 
evidence that democracy gives rise to transitory upsurges of corruption.  
A contradictory, but nevertheless important, theoretical view is that some levels of corruption can 
be beneficial for both economic growth and overall development (Huntington, 1968, Bardhan, 
1997). This is because while government officials seek to collect bribes, they also give them incen-
tives to work harder. As such, Huntington argues that a corrupt-free society might find some cor-
rupt behavior welcome as “a lubricant easing the path to modernization” (1968:68). Needless to 
say, a general consensus is lacking. 
What about the effect of corruption on democratic consolidation? Rose-Ackerman suggests that 
corruption harms both economic and political development, especially when considering its more 
long-term effects (1996) and Lawal argues that the effects of corruption can be felt in the political, 
social and economical sphere (2007). Hsueh contends that basic democratic principles are violated 
by corrupt behavior and it undermines the legitimacy of the democratic system in general and its 
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citizens trust in core institutions in particular (2007:8) Alleviating corruption is thus perhaps one of 
the most important questions for many states and governments if democratic, social and economi-
cal development shall be achieved. But why does corruption constitute such a problem and how 
does it impede democratic development? Is there an academic consensus regarding this? 
Corruption is argued to be a threat to a number of democratic mechanisms, particularly the legiti-
macy of the political system, electoral participation and to institutions (Johnston, 2002).  
Many scholars have used corruption perception data to show how corruption relates to trust and 
confidence in leaders and the political system. Della Porta showed that corruption is inversely relat-
ed to government trust (2000); that citizens in corrupt states exhibit lower levels of trust in, and 
evaluations of, their political system was shown by Anderson and Tverdova (2003). Chang and Chu 
conclude their study by claiming that state institutions eventually become personal instruments for 
corrupt leaders after finding that political corruption has a strong trust-eroding effect that leads to 
both a mistrust in institutions, but also a loss of legitimization for the political system (2006).  
Adverse consequences follow a regime that does not gain legitimacy from its own people. This is 
particularly important for democratizing or recently democratized states since legitimacy is essential 
for the success of both the authority of the new regime and the states institutional arrangements 
(Hsueh, 2007). Hsueh argues that there is probably no more common and profound obstacle for 
new democracies to consolidate than if holders of state power exhibit extensive corrupt behavior 
(2007:8). This is because when political authority and bureaucratic authority are “put out for rent” 
in a corrupt society, due process and civil liberties are endangered and the policies that are adopted 
and that soon will be implemented are generally considered to be a façade (2007:11). As such, cor-
ruption preempts competition at all levels and weakens institutions. 
How does this come about? Why are institutions weakened? Klitgaard (1988) gives an explanation 
on how corruption equals monopoly plus discretion, minus accountability. The author analyzes bureaucratic 
corruption and means that it flourishes when officials have control over valuable goods or deci-
sions (monopoly), whilst also having the power to decide on how to distribute them (discretion) 
without the need to answer for their actions (a lack of accountability) (1988:75). Widespread cor-
ruption repeats this process and thus undermines competitive participation on all levels of society 
and weakens official institutions while it at the same time builds up networks of corrupt behavior.  
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When corrupt networks have influence it usually benefits those who “have” rather than those who 
do not, and being a political opposition in such circumstances only means that you will not get a 
piece of the cake (Johnston, 2000), triggering further corrupt behavior. Although corruption also 
exist in full-fledged democracies, the “rules of the game” are already established with an underlying 
consensus on those rules (2000:14), meaning that corruption might still occur but do not threaten 
the democratic values and norms and the basic democratic character and its institutions. 
Has contemporary literature addressed the most important issues in an extensive and sufficient 
way? Are there more scholarly challenges? Indeed, as contemporary research on corruption has 
increased the understanding on why and how corruption might be detrimental to the democratic pro-
cess, focus has not necessarily been on democratic consolidation and how corruption impedes 
long-lasting democracy.  
Thus, surprisingly, there is a gap in the literature. Johnston (2002) is actually one of the few who 
provide an overview of major themes in the work on corruption and democratization that offers an 
exploration of the connection between corruption, politics and markets in newly liberalizing coun-
tries. The author finds that the economic and political consolidation challenges require an interplay 
and attention to both institutions, meaning openness and autonomy of institutions, and participa-
tion, meaning the opportunities available for political and economical participation (2002:30).  
Despite Johnston’s attempts, this theoretical section has revealed an empirical gap in the literature 
in regard to perceived levels of corruption and its effect on democratic consolidation. As such, let 
us have a look at the purpose of this paper and the contribution that can be made. 
 
Addressing the inconclusiveness 
This paper has shown that corruption can be detrimental in it self and that it also can be argued to 
have long-lasting negative effects on democracy as a process. It has also shown that this increased 
knowledge of corruption has made corruption a priority among policy circles. This is in particular 
the case with Africa – the continent that is by far most plagued by corruption. It is also the conti-
nent with the most democratic setbacks and where the democratic traditions and institutions are 
shaky at best. 
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Furthermore, there are both theoretical and empirical needs to address the empirical gap and lack 
of systematic studies addressing whether successful state building, at least democratic consolidation, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are contingent on the level of perceived corruption and the functioning of 
state institutions.  
The purpose of this paper is thus to contribute to the preconditionist view of democratization the-
ory and attempt to develop and test the argument which contends that the variation in democrat-
ic consolidation in Sub-Saharan African countries can be attributed to levels of corruption 
at early stages of democratization. It will more specifically examine: 
 Do different degrees of corruption (at t0 = 1996) lead to different outcomes of 
democratic consolidation in Africa (at t+1 = 2011)? 
 
Data and Models 
The data consists of seven variables measuring the effect of corruption on democratic consolida-
tion, including control variables. 
The data used in this paper comes from different sources: i) official data on elections derived from 
Internet sources, mainly the African Elections Database; ii) indicator of corruption from Transpar-
ency Internationals Corruption Perception Index (CPI); and iii) control variables from the Quality 
of Government data set, the Afrobarometer and the Standardized World Income Inequality Data-
base (SWIID). 
The independent variable: Measure of corruption 
Corruption can come in many types of definitions and be seen in many different forms. The defini-
tion of corruption will be limited to misuse of public power for private gain (Treisman, 2007), regarded as 
the most common practice by scholars in the corruption literature. With regard to the distinction 
between the “private” and the “public”, I leave private corruption aside and focus on the effects of 
public corruption. These types of corrupt behavior has more direct effects for the society as a 
whole and plagues society with problems of governance, political authority, legitimacy and democ-
racy (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2010). 
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The dependent variable: Democratic consolidation 
In previous research, most notably Schedler (2001) but also O’Donnell (1996), there has been a 
critique of measures of degrees of democratic consolidation that are “confusing”, “inconsistent” or 
“empirically untraceable” (see O’Donnell, 1996). However, it is truly difficult to operationalize 
consolidation, or as Schedler puts it – “once we resolve the question of how to define democratic 
consolidation, we run into even more intricate problem of how to observe it” (Schedler:, 2001:67).  
Building on Schedler’s argument that “the way political actors handle instances of alteration in gov-
ernment constitutes an excellent indicator of their democratic commitment” (2001:73), I will em-
ploy a method where three consecutive elections, free and fair (counting all national elections) and 
where the opponent accepts defeat, constitute an indication of democratic consolidation.  
Control variables 
GDP/capita is added because it has been argued that it has effect on formal state institutions in at 
least two ways. Firstly, it gives a state more resources to expand their welfare system (Rothstein, et 
al, 2009) making the role of bureaucrats and state bureaucracy more important “giving room” for 
corrupt behavior. Secondly, an increased economical development leads to a demand in well func-
tioning state institutions (La Porta, et al., 1999).  
It has been contended in previous research that democracy is historically tied to the existence of 
certain classes, in particular a middle class (Moore, 1966, Osei, 2012). Additionally, Lipset has also 
argued of the importance of a broad middle class in democratization processes. This is because 
economic equality tends to be important for consolidation (Anderson, 2008). The Gini index is the 
most commonly used measure of inequality of income or wealth. However, the use of these Gini-
coefficients are to be used with care in regard to both within- and cross-country comparisons since 
they rely on a variety of information sources and a diverse set of income and population concepts, 
sample sizes and statistical methods (Teorell, et al., 2012).  
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization has been used in several studies such as Treisman (2000) and Mauro 
(1995), and is argued to be highly correlated with corruption. It has also been argued by Persson & 
Sjöstedt (2010) to negatively affect a large number of development outcomes, for instance quality 
of government, since bureaucrats in a more diverse ethno-linguistic society are more likely to favor 
people from their own ethnic group. 
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Finally, Uslaner and Rothstein have recently argued that there exists a causal mechanism between 
universal education and control of corruption (2012). Their results stress the importance of how a 
country’s system of education historically matters greatly for contemporary levels of corruption. As 
such, higher levels of education should suppress the effect of corruption increasing the probability 
of democratic consolidation. 
Models 
The objective of the analysis is to investigate the general effects of corruption on democratic consol-
idation. The purpose of a multiple regression analysis is to see the effect of several independ-
ent variables on the dependent variable. In order to conduct my analysis I will use democratic 
consolidation as the dependent variable in t(+1), and use degree of corruption in (t0) as the 
independent variable. By using this methodological approach, instead of a difference in the 
dependent variable between t(+1) and (t0), I enable the influence of corruption (t0) on demo-
cratic consolidation t(+1) to vary. 
The dependent variable, democratic consolidation, will in this paper be treated as a binary variable 
thus making it suitable using an ordered logistic regression analysis (Edling & Hedström, 2003:173) 
instead of, for example, an OLS-regression analysis. The regression analysis estimates the relation-
ship between a dependent variable (which is categorical) and one or several independent variables 
(that usually are continuous) by converting the dependent variable to scores of probability 
(2003:178). 
All analyses are conducted in SPSS. 
The hypotheses in the focal relationship between the degree of corruption and democratic consoli-
dation can be illustrated with the model below: 
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FIGURE 1: BIVARIATE MODEL OF ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Figure comments: The figure shows the bivariate theoretical model in which the continuous variable, degree of corruption at 
(t0), is the independent variable (X) and the binary variable democratic consolidation at t(+1) is the dependent variable. 
 
The hypotheses in the bivariate model is that (1) if the level of corruption is low, the probabil-
ity of democratic consolidation will increase, and (2) if there are high levels of corruption the 
results will be the contrary – the probability of consolidation will decrease. 
In the multivariate model it is the effect of the control variables on Y rather than on X that is of 
significance since I am interested in the variation in democratic consolidation. The assumed rela-
tionship in focus of the paper is, consequently, that there will be a change in Y, democratic consoli-
dation, if there is a change in X, degree of corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree of corruption (X) at t(0) Democratic consolidation (Y) at t(+1) 
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FIGURE 2: MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure comments: The figure shows the multivariate theoretical model in which the continuous variable, degree of corruption at 
(t0), is the independent variable (X) and the binary variable democratic consolidation at t(+1) is the dependent variable. All 
control variables – GDP/capita (Z), economic inequality (T), ethno-linguistic fractionalization (U) and educational level (V) – 
are continuous. 
As such, the hypothesis is that i) less economic inequality ii) higher GDP per capita; iii) less ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and iv) higher educational levels will separately increase the probability of 
consolidation. 
 
Analysis 
This section will be outlined as follows; first, I will present descriptive statistics on the focal rela-
tionship that will show, firstly, if there is a variation in the countries that can be considered consoli-
dated between 1996 and 2011. Secondly, the level of perceived corruption in these countries will be 
Degree of corruption (X) at t(0) Democratic consolidation (Y) 
at t(+1) 
GDP per capita (Z) 
 
Economic inequality (T) 
 
 
 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(U) 
 
 
Educational level (V) 
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presented in the same manner stretching from 1996 to 2011. After the initial descriptive statistics, 
the first model will be tested in the regression analysis before controlling the entire theoretical 
model using the control variables.  
Descriptive analysis 
How many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were consolidated in 1996? Using the condition that at 
least three free and fair national elections should have been taken place before a country can be 
considered consolidated there were 6 consolidated democracies in 1996. These were Benin, Bot-
swana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius and Senegal. The same number in 2011 is 9, consisting of 
Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe and South 
Africa. 
 
TABLE 1: CONSOLIDATION STATUS OF THE COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2011, FRE-
QUENCY AND PERCENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table comments: The table shows in frequencies and percent how many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that can be considered 
consolidated in 2011. Three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the electoral results, constitute demo-
cratic consolidation. Objective data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database. 
 
As such, there is a small increase in the number of consolidated democracies, as Mali, Namibia, Sao 
Tome and Principe and South Africa have been added to the group at the same time as Senegal has 
fallen out. As this is being written Mali should also fall out but seeing that this is data from 2011 
Countries Freq. % 
Not consolidated 40 81.63 
Consolidated 9 18.37 
Total 49 100.00 
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they will remain in the data set as consolidated2. Nevertheless, the variation is very limited between 
the years, although existent.  
What about the levels of corruption? Unfortunately the Corruptions Perceptions Index does not 
have ratings for all Sub-Saharan African countries at the same point in time. For some countries the 
first ratings are from 1996, but some are as late as 2005. The corruption levels vary between the 
countries from as low as 0.7 (Nigeria) up to 6.1 (Botswana) where higher levels indicate less corrup-
tion. The figure can be found in appendix. 
 
** Table 2 (see appendix) ** 
 
TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE BIVARIATE MODEL 
 
 
 
 
Table comments: The table shows a summary of statistics of the two variables in the bivariate model. Democratic consolidation 
t(+1) is a binary variable (0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the elec-
toral results, constitute democratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) 
is a continuous variable that ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and 
data on corruption is used from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. 
 
                                                     
2
 It should be said that it is unlucky that Senegal has fallen out although being an example in the introduction of this 
paper. The reason is simple, while being an electoral democracy and continuously being labeled as partly free by Free-
dom House since the 1970’s the conditions to be considered a consolidated democracy was to not only have regular 
elections, but also that they should be free and fair and that the opponents should have accepted the electoral results. 
At the same time as the incumbent President won the election in 2007, due to a ruling from the constitutional court, 
major opposition parties boycotting the elections marked the parliamentary elections in the same year. This irregularity 
and instability further shows the variation in democratic consolidation in the Sub-Saharan countries. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consolidated, 2011 49 .1836735 .3912304 0 1 
Corruption, 1996 48 2.9125 1.071016 0.7 6.1 
  20 
Table 3 shows a summary of the two variables in the focal relationship. The difference in observa-
tions comes from South Sudan due to the country’s independence in 2011. Let us also have a look 
at the multivariate model before conducting the bivariate analysis. 
 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
 
Table comments: The table shows a summary of statistics of the six variables in the multivariate model. Democratic consolidation 
t(+1) is a binary variable (0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the elec-
toral results, constitute democratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) 
is a continuous variable that ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and 
data on corruption is used from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. 
 
Looking at the summary statistics for the multivariate model, we can see that the variable for the 
Gini index, economic equality, has fewer observations than the other variables. In the multivariate 
model the implication is that the amount of missing observations will be 14, where 28 remaining 
countries in the model are “Not consolidated” and 7 are “Consolidated”. This further decreases the 
amount of variation between these two variables. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consolidated, 2011 49 .1836735 .3912304 0 1 
Corruption, 1996 48 2.9125 1.071016 .7 6.1 
Economic inequality, 1996 35 48.24698 9.110324 35.79996 73.2 
GDP/capita, 1996 46 2240.715 3297.665 160.1593 15025.41 
Ethno-linguistic fr., 1996 47 .6584292 .2304416 0 .930175 
Educational level, 1996 48 3.067708 1.732066 .55 8.3 
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Addressing the small N problem and the small variation in the dependent variable 
Seen from the descriptive statistics above, besides the small N of the Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, the variation in the sample is quite small and the same countries that were consolidated in 
1996 are more or less the same in 2011 (4 countries added, 1 removed). What implications will this 
have and can the statistical results be questioned? 
When having nations as units of analysis, the small N problem arises as the number of available 
units is by itself limited. Goldthorpe (1997) argue that difficulties tend to be faced when applying 
techniques of multivariate analysis. This is because: 
 
“Statistically, this means that there are too few degrees of freedom, that models become 
“over-determined”, that inter-correlations among independent variables cannot be ade-
quately dealt with and that results may not be robust” (1997:4). 
 
As such, competing explanations of the dependent variable cannot be properly evaluated (1997:4). 
How can this be dealt with and where does the problem lie?  
According to Goldthorpe (1997), similarly argued by King, Keohane and Verba (1994:119), the 
small N problem is not a problem of methodology, but rather the lack of data. Consequently, the 
insufficient information available to answer the complex nature of the macro-level questions can 
only be addressed by increasing the information available for analysis. Because of this, and the small 
variation in my dependent variable, the interpretations made in both the bivariate and multivariate 
analysis needs to be careful. 
 
Bivariate analysis 
In the bivariate analysis I investigate what effect the independent variable has on the dependent 
variable in the focal relationship. I use democratic consolidation at t(+1) which is 2011, and degree 
in corruption at (t0) which is 1996. By doing this I allow the influence of corruption to vary. Since I 
use a logistic regression the outcome of democratic consolidation will be predicted contingent on 
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the levels of corruption, the outcome will thus be a score of probability. However first, let us look 
at a correlation matrix of the focal relationship.  
 
TABLE 5: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE BIVARIATE MODEL 
Variable Consolidation, 2011 Corruption, 1996 
Consolidation, 2011 1.000   
Corruption, 1996 0.649 1.000 
N = 48 
 
Table comments: The table shows correlation coefficients of the bivariate model. The correlation coefficient can range from -1 to 
+1, where -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation and +1 indicates a perfect positive correlation, and 0 indicating no correla-
tion at all. Democratic consolidation t(+1) is a binary variable (0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, 
where the opponent accepted the electoral results, constitute democratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not 
consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) is a continuous variable that ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the 
African Elections Database, and data on corruption is used from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. 
  
The correlation of the bivariate model has 48 observations with missing values in both the inde-
pendent variable (South Sudan). The correlation matrix reveals a positive relationship between the 
two variables in the focal relationship, meaning that if one score increases so does the other. Let us 
now have a look at the logistic regression. 
How much does the probability of consolidation increase contingent on level of perceived corrup-
tion and how much has our model been able to predict the values correctly? 
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TABLE 6: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF THE BIVARIATE MODEL, PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
 
Table comments: The table shows a logistic regression of the bivariate model. Democratic consolidation t(+1) is a binary variable 
(0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the electoral results, constitute demo-
cratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) is a continuous variable that 
ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and data on corruption is used from 
Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. 
 
Looking at table 6, showing the bivariate model, the coefficient of corruption at 1996 is 1.81, mean-
ing that if the corruption level increases by 1 the probability of democratic consolidation also in-
creases by 1.81. The independent variable thus has a positive effect on the dependent variable indi-
cating that an increase in the degree of corruption (meaning less corruption) also increases the 
probability of democratic consolidation.  
Looking at the significance column we can be pretty sure that the effect is not caused by coinci-
dental variation in the data. Observing the Pseudo R2-values, the “Cox & Snell R Square” and the 
“Nagelkerke R Square” show values of .333 and .537 respectively.  Whilst these are measures 
adapted for logistic regressions to serve the same function as R2 in a linear regression, they cannot 
be interpreted as the amount of explained variance (Cox & Snell, 1989). However, higher values 
indicate that the independent variables are better at predicting the dependent variable. This indica-
tor will be of more relevance in the multivariate model when we can see how the model develops 
when entering more variables. 
The positive relationship is further visualized by looking at the classification table below (Table 7), 
where we can see that the bivariate model correctly estimated 37 of 39 of the countries that are not 
consolidated 2011 (94,9%), but only 5 out of 9 that are consolidated (55,6%). This could perhaps 
Consolidation, 2011 B Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption, 1996 1.81 .573 3.16 0.002 .6859786 2.932883 
Constant -7.39 1.992 -3.71 0.000 -11.29902 -3.489887 
Log likelihood ratio 13.460 
     Cox & Snell R Square .333 
     Nagelkerke R Square .537 
     N 48 
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be attributed to the very little variation in these countries between 1996 and 2011. Nonetheless, the 
model gives us a correct estimation of 87,5%, indicating a strong estimation model. 
 
TABLE 7: CLASSIFICATION TABLE – PREDICTED ESTIMATIONS, FREQUENCIES AND PERCENT 
 
Consolidated, 2011 
 Consolidated, 2011 0 1 Correct % 
0 37 2 94,90% 
1 4 5 55,60% 
Overall percentage     87,50% 
 
Table comments: The table shows a classification table of predicted values for the bivariate model. Democratic consolidation t(+1) 
is a binary variable (0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the electoral 
results, constitute democratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) is a 
continuous variable that ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and data on 
corruption is used from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. 
 
We have now come quite far in our research question addressing the degree of corruption as a pre-
condition for democratic consolidation. It can now be contended that the higher degrees of corrup-
tion a country has (t0), the more probable it is that it will be consolidated at t(+1). But how large is 
the effect? 
Since this is a nonlinear model there is a need to take the values of all covariates into account to 
understand what is going on in the model. The table below (table 8) shows a table where the deriva-
tive of the mean expected outcome has been calculated with respect to the specified variable, in this 
case corruption levels at 1996. 
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TABLE 8: LOGISTIC REGRESSION, CALCULATED MARGINS OF THE BIVARIATE MODEL 
Table comments: The table shows adjusted predictions for the bivariate model. Democratic consolidation t(+1) is a binary varia-
ble (0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the electoral results, constitute 
democratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) is a continuous variable 
that ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and data on corruption is used 
from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. 
 
Table 8 shows adjusted predictions for the bivariate model where the independent variable (degree 
of corruption at 1996) ranges from 1-11 on the Y-axis (0-10 in the data) and where higher scores 
indicate less corruption. The dependent variable ranges from 0-1 where 1 indicates consolidation. 
The table shows that a score of 1 on the corruption scale shows a margin result of .0006143, which 
gives a margin score of probability of 0.006% of consolidating into a democracy. A score in the 
middle, scoring a 6, shows a margin score of .8392555 that gives an 83,9% consolidation probabil-
ity. As such, the probability of consolidation steadily increases contingent on the degree of corrup-
tion.  
To visualize the effect of the independent variable further we can use a graph illustrating the bivari-
ate model: 
 
Delta-method 
    At Margin Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
1 .0006143 .001223 0.50 0.615 -.0017827 .0030113 
2 .0037396 .0053852 0.69 0.487 -.0068152 .0142944 
3 .0224098 .0203992 1.10 0.272  -.0175718 .0623914 
4 .1228016 .059185 2.07 0.038 .0068012  .2388021 
5 .4608971 .1559287 2.96 0.003 .1552824 .7665117 
6 .8392555 .1442226 5.82 0.000 .5565845 1.121927 
7 .9695908 .0470744 20.60 0.000 .8773267  1.061855 
8 .9948907  .010917  91.13 0.000 .9734937  1.016288 
9 .9991598 .0022734 439.51 0.000 .9947041 1.003615 
10 .9998623 .0004505  2219.32 0.000 .9989793  1.000745 
11 .9999775 .0000866 1.2e+04 0.000 .9998078 1.000147 
N = 48 
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FIGURE 3: GRAPH OF THE BIVARIATE MODEL, PREDICTED PROBABILITIES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure comments: The graph illustrates the predicted probabilities of the bivariate model. 48 observations. The Y-axis shows 
probabilities of democratic consolidation at 2011 which ranges between 0-1 (Not consolidated-Consolidated) and where the X-
axis shows degrees of corruption ranging between 0-10 (1-11 in the graph).  
 
Because of the binary dependent variable the graph can never go under 0 and above 1, and as ex-
pected, we are seeing a graph that shows a positive relationship between the independent and de-
pendent variable. We can also see that the graph shows a curve, which is logical seeing as the lo-
gistic regression estimates probabilities. The graph again further visualizes that higher degrees of 
corruption increases the probability of democratic consolidation. 
The bivariate logistic regression, and other visualizations of the bivariate model, has given us fur-
ther reason to believe that the degrees of corruption at a certain time serve as an important precon-
dition for the probability of a country to democratically consolidate at a later stage in time. Will the 
effect sustain when we control for spuriousness in the multivariate model? 
Multivariate analysis 
The hypothesis in the multivariate model is that i) less economic inequality ii) higher GDP per capi-
ta; iii) less ethno-linguistic fractionalization and iv) higher educational levels will separately increase 
the probability of consolidation. Let us first have a look at the correlation matrix for the multivari-
ate model on the next page (table 9). 
0
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0,6
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TABLE 9: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
 
Table comments: The table shows correlation coefficients for the multivariate model. Levels of significance: * p<0,05. The correla-
tion coefficient can range from -1 to +1, where -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation and +1 indicates a perfect positive 
correlation, and 0 indicating no correlation at all. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and 
data on corruption is used from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. Economic inequality is a Gini 
index from the Standardized World Income Database (SWIID), GDP/capita is data from the World Bank and OECD 
found in the Quality of Government data set, ethno-linguistic fractionalization is from Alesina et al., 2003, found in the Quali-
ty of Government data set and educational level is from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of 
Washington, also found in the Quality of Government data set. 
 
As we saw from the summary of statistics for the multivariate model, the amount of observations 
decreases due to the Gini index only having 35 observations. Used in the multivariate correlation 
were thus 35 observations with missing values due to the lack of observations.  
The correlation matrix in table 9 reveals an increased positive relationship between the two varia-
bles in the focal relationship. When controlling for the other variables the relationship between 
degree of corruption at 1996 and democratic consolidation is at 0.7382, which can be considered 
great. The correlation is also significant at the .05-level.  
Regarding the other variables in the multivariate model, GDP/capita and Educational level at 1996 
can be considered weak with correlation coefficients at 0.3784 and 0.3695 respectively. The correla-
tion of democratic consolidation and economic inequality at 1996 is not really meaningful with the 
coefficient at 0.1513, at the same time as ethno-linguistic fractionalization shows a very weak nega-
tive correlation to democratic consolidation with the coefficient at -0.2100. 
Variable Consolidated, 
2011 
Corruption, 
1996 
Economic 
inequality, 
1996 
GDP/capita
, 1996 
Ethno-
linguistic fr., 
1996 
Educational 
level, 1996 
Consolidated, 2011 1.0000 
     Corruption, 1996 0.7383* 1.0000 
    Economic inequality, 
1996 0.1513 0.3082 1.0000 
   GDP/capita, 1996 0.3784 0.4593* 0.0556 1.0000 
  Ethno-linguistic fr., 1996 -0.2100 -0.3028* -0.1994 -0.0951 1.0000 
 Educational level, 1996 0.3695 0.4215* 0.3765* 0.5034* -0.2490* 1.0000 
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Let us have a look at the multivariate logistic regression to understand the probability of democratic 
consolidation for the entire multivariate model. What the multivariate logistic regression does is 
that the coefficients estimate the extent of each outcome relationship after it has adjusted for all 
other predictors in the model. 
 
TABLE 10: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
Consolidation, 2011 B Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Corruption, 1996 2.758  1.159714  2.38 0.017  .4849989  5.030995 
Economic inequality, 1996 -.0897516  .1004881 -0.89 0.372 -.2867046 .1072014 
GDP/capita, 1996 -.0000618 .0003469  -0.18  0.859 -.0007417 .0006181 
Ethno-linguistic fr., 1996 -.7687141 4.524594  -0.17 0.865  -9.636756 8.099328 
Educational level, 1996 .1701557  .5609806  0.30 0.762 -.9293462 1.269658 
Constant -6.620524  5.857661 -1.13  0.258 -18.10133 4.860281 
Log likelihood ratio -6.8225791 
     Cox & Snell R Square .457 
     Nagelkerke R Square .723 
     N 35 
      
Table comments: The table shows a logistic regression of the multivariate model. Democratic consolidation t(+1) is a binary 
variable (0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the electoral results, consti-
tute democratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) is a continuous 
variable that ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and data on corruption 
is used from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. Economic inequality is a Gini index from the Stand-
ardized World Income Database (SWIID), GDP/capita is data from the World Bank and OECD found in the Quality of 
Government data set, ethno-linguistic fractionalization is from Alesina et al., 2003, found in the Quality of Government data 
set and educational level is from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington, also found in 
the Quality of Government data set. 
 
In controlling for other possible explanation in the multivariate model, we see in the table above 
(table 10) that the only statistically significant variable was degree of corruption in 1996 (.017). No 
other variables are statistically significant which is remarkable. Whilst there is a small N it is notable 
that GDP/capita and ethno-linguistic fractionalization is not significant. Seemingly corruption 
trumps all other variables. 
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The coefficient of corruption at 1996 increases from about 1.81 to about 2.76, meaning that for 
one units increase in corruption at (t0), we can expect a 2.76 increase in the ordered log odds being 
at a higher level of democratic consolidation in 2011. This is given that all other variables in the 
model are held constant. 
Seeing the Pseudo R2-values for the multivariate model, not to be interpreted as the amount of 
explained variance (Cox & Snell, 1989), the “Cox & Snell R Square” and the “Nagelkerke R Square” 
show values of .457 and .723 respectively. In comparison to the bivariate model these values have 
increased indicating a better prediction of the dependent variable. 
By looking at the classification table below (Table 11), we can see that the multivariate model cor-
rectly estimated 100% of the countries that are not consolidated in 2011 and 5 out of 7 that are 
consolidated (71,4%). The multivariate model thus correctly estimated 94,3% of the observed 
countries (35 observations). 
 
TABLE 11: CLASSIFICATION TABLE – PREDICTED ESTIMATIONS, FREQUENCIES AND PER-
CENT 
 
Consolidated, 2011 
 Consolidated, 2011 0 1 Correct % 
0 28 0 100,00% 
1 2 5 71,40% 
Overall percentage     94,30% 
 
Table comments: The table shows a classification table of predicted values for the multivariate model. Democratic consolidation 
t(+1) is a binary variable (0-1) constructed where three consecutive free and fair elections, where the opponent accepted the elec-
toral results, constitute democratic consolidation (1), and where this has not taken place is not consolidated (0). Corruption (t0) 
is a continuous variable that ranges from 0-10. The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and 
data on corruption is used from Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. Economic inequality is a Gini 
index from the Standardized World Income Database (SWIID), GDP/capita is data from the World Bank and OECD 
found in the Quality of Government data set, ethno-linguistic fractionalization is from Alesina et al., 2003, found in the Quali-
ty of Government data set and educational level is from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of 
Washington, also found in the Quality of Government data set. 
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Since this, like the bivariate model, is a nonlinear model the values of all covariates are needed to be 
taken into account to understand what is going on in the model. The table below shows a table of 
the multivariate model where the derivative of the mean expected outcome has been calculated 
with respect to the specified variable, in this case corruption levels at 1996. 
Similar to the bivariate model above (table 8), table 12 shows adjusted predictions for the multivari-
ate model where the independent variable (degree of corruption at 1996) ranges from 1-11 on the 
Y-axis (0-10 in the data) and where higher scores indicate less corruption. When controlling for the 
other variables, the probability of consolidation has decreased when scoring low on the corruption 
scale (higher corruption) whilst it has increased when scoring high. As such, a score of 1 on the 
corruption scale gives a margin score of 0.001% of consolidating into a democracy, whilst a score in 
the middle, scoring a 6, shows a margin score of .9379997, indicating a probability of 93,7% of 
democratic consolidation. 
 
TABLE 12: LOGISTIC REGRESSION, CALCULATED MARGINS OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
Delta-method 
     At Margin Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
1 .0000155 .0000655  0.24 0.813 -.0001128  .0001438 
2 .0002447 .0007547 0.32  0.746  -.0012346  .0017239 
3 .003844 .0075966  0.51  0.613  -.0110451  .0187332 
4 .0573575 .0551451  1.04  0.298 -.0507249 .1654399 
5 .4896548  .2283161  2.14 0.032 .0421634 .9371461 
6 .9379997 .1059523  8.85 0.000  .7303371  1.145662 
7 .9958256 .0121148  82.20 0.000 .9720811  1.01957 
8 .9997342  .0010746 930.32 0.000  .997628  1.00184 
9 .9999831 .0000875 1.1e+04  0.000 .9998117 1.000155 
10 .9999989 6.78e-06  1.5e+05  0.000  .9999856  1.000012 
11 .9999999  5.28e-07 1.9e+06  0.000  .9999989 1.000001 
Table comments: The data on elections are collected from the African Elections Database, and data on corruption is used from 
Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index. Economic inequality is a Gini index from the Standardized World 
Income Database (SWIID), GDP/capita is data from the World Bank and OECD found in the Quality of Government data 
set, ethno-linguistic fractionalization is from Alesina et al., 2003, found in the Quality of Government data set and educational 
level is from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington, also found in the Quality of 
Government data set. 
  31 
Again, the effects can be visualized further by using a graph depicting the multivariate model. 
 
FIGURE 4: GRAPH OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL, PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table comments: The graph illustrates the predicted probabilities of the multivariate model. 35 observations. The Y-axis shows 
probabilities of democratic consolidation at 2011 which ranges between 0-1 (Not consolidated-Consolidated) and where the X-
axis shows degrees of corruption ranging between 0-10 (1-11 in the graph). 
 
Comparable to the bivariate model, the graph depicting the multivariate model again further visual-
izes a strong positive relationship and that higher degrees of corruption increase the probability of 
democratic consolidation at a later stage in time.  
The multivariate model has, like the bivariate model, visualized the strong covariation between the 
degree of corruption and democratic consolidation at a later time. The effect in the multivariate 
model increased from 1.81 in the bivariate model to about 2.76 indicating a robust positive rela-
tionship. It was also the only significant relationship in the multivariate model. Yet, due to the small 
N-problem in the multivariate model the robustness of the findings should be handled with care. 
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Reiteration and conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the preconditionist view of democratization theory 
and attempt to develop and test the argument that the variation in democratic consolidation in Sub-
Saharan African countries could be attributed to levels of corruption at early stages of democratiza-
tion.  
In an attempt to accomplish this, I have conducted a multiple regression analysis to enable the in-
fluence of corruption on democratic consolidation to vary whilst at the same time controlling for 
other factors that may affect democratic consolidation. Since my dependent variable is binary, I 
have used a logistic regression with continuous independent variables to test both my bivariate and 
multivariate theoretical models. 
Both the bivariate and the multivariate logistic regression conducted in the analysis, and other visu-
alizations of the two models, has given us further reason to believe that the degrees of corruption at 
a certain time serve as an important precondition for the probability of a country to democratically 
consolidate at a later stage in time. Hence, it can be contended that higher degrees of corruption at 
t(0), meaning less corruption, increase the probability that a country will be consolidated at t(+1). 
In terms of the effect, we can also assert that if the corruption level in the bivariate model increased 
by 1 the probability of democratic consolidation also increases by 1.81. The effect in the multivari-
ate model increased from 1.81 to about 2.76 indicating a robust positive relationship. It was also the 
only significant relationship in the multivariate model. 
However, whilst the covariation between degrees of corruption and democratic consolidation 
seems to be strong there are certain obstacle that constitute reasons to regard the findings with 
some care and to pose further ideas in order to develop this study. 
The small N problem appears both in regard to the number of units in the analysis and the insuffi-
cient data available to answer the questions at hand. Hence, both the reliability and the validity of 
the data and the regression analysis are not foolproof. This is because not all variables had data 
available for the year 1996. I have tried to overcome this by collecting data as close to 1996 as pos-
sible. Moreover, using the Gini index of economic inequality the amount of observations in the 
logistic regression decreased from 48 to 35 making the robustness of the analysis weaker. As such, 
the data is hard to interpret correctly. 
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Considering the methodology, a time-series analysis would have been interesting to conduct in 
order to see consolidation trends across the continent. However, as argued previously, the problem 
with implementing a time-series comes from the data available to measure levels of corruption. As 
such, what we see are images of the perceptions of corruption at that specific time, and conse-
quently, whilst we might be successful in accounting for parts of the variation, we cannot really tell 
what is going on between 1996 and 2011 in terms of social processes and actions.  
With these obstacles the implication is that the results can be argued not to be robust. How can this 
be overcome? Goldthorpe (1997) argues that the solution might be easy to state, but in reality a bit 
harder to accomplish: “simply to increase the information that we have available for analysis” 
(1997:6). 
Increasing the data can be done in several ways. One way is to employ a case-oriented approach on 
successful and unsuccessful cases and look closer at different mechanisms separately and how they 
operate in those cases. Another way is to exploit more exhaustively the cases that already have good 
data sources. What is truly essential however, for both variable- and case-oriented approaches, is to 
increase the units available for analysis and to also further their geographical and socioeconomic 
range, as well as the range of time, in order to achieve greater variation and quality of data. This is 
particularly essential for countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa where the quality and availa-
bility of data is lacking.  
Yet, regardless of findings and obstacles along the way, this paper contributes to the preconditionist 
school of democratization theory and a broadened comprehension in the potentially detrimental 
effects of corruption on democracy and democratic consolidation. Whilst no causality has been 
found, I have at least found a correlation that should be explored more in detail. 
Why is further research important? Analyzing corruption in a country gives us an understanding of 
its nature and helps us understand its deeper developmental and consolidation effects. Thus, one 
aspect is that it gives us more knowledge about the nature of corruption and potentially – how to 
combat it. Another aspect is that it gives us knowledge of the preconditions for democratic govern-
ance and how to increase the acceptance and legitimacy for such processes. This is also crucial for 
outside actors such as policy circles, development agencies and organizations. 
An example of such a process is within international development cooperation. A big part of the 
promotion of democratic governance is preventing and combating corruption. Indeed, both the 
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Paris declaration in 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action 2008, and the Busan Outcome Document 
(from the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea, 2011) set an agenda to-
wards a further focus on achieving results, greater transparency, ownership and increased account-
ability for improving aid effectiveness. In such processes, the knowledge of corruption as a precon-
dition could be essential for successful program implementations.  
Finally, whilst preconditions such as corruption make it hard for new, young and vulnerable de-
mocracies to consolidate an increased knowledge of its existence and pervasiveness should not 
make us feel discouraged. Instead, further research has to be conducted using different approaches 
and methodologies. Only then can we understand, cope with and alleviate the impact of harmful 
preconditions.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 2: CORRUPTION LEVELS AT 1996 
 
Country Corruption level, 1996 
Angola 1.7 
Benin 3.2 
Botswana 6.1 
Burkina Faso 3.0 
Burundi 2.3 
Cameroon 2.4 
Cape Verde 4.9 
Central Afr. Rep. 2.4 
Chad 1.7 
Comoros 2.6 
Congo, Rep. of 2.2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 2.0 
Ivory Coast 3.1 
Djibouti 2.9 
Equatorial Guinea 1.9 
Eritrea 2.6 
Ethiopia 3.2 
  41 
Gabon 2.9 
Gambia 2.5 
Ghana 3.3 
Guinea 1.9 
Guinea-Bissau 2.2 
Kenya 2.5 
Lesotho 3.4 
Liberia 2.2 
Madagascar 2.6 
Malawi 4.1 
Mali 3.0 
Mauritania 3.1 
Mauritius 5.0 
Mozambique 3.5 
Namibia 5.3 
Niger 2.2 
Nigeria .7 
Rwanda 2.5 
Sao Tome & Principe 2.7 
Senegal 3.3 
Seychelles 4.4 
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Sierra Leone 2.2 
Somalia 2.1 
South Africa 5.6 
South Sudan NA 
Sudan 2.3 
Swaziland 2.7 
Tanzania 1.9 
Togo 2.4 
Uganda 2.7 
Zambia 3.5 
Zimbabwe 2.9 
 
 
